Abstract: Since 1976, more than thirty states have eliminated their 'death' taxes and many others have reduced them. This unexplored case of interstate tax competition presents a unique opportunity to develop a new, more satisfying definition of 'competitor' based on historical elderly migration patterns. Using data from 1967 onward, we outline the recent history of state 'death' tax competition and present a spatial econometric analysis. Interstate tax competition is evident and grows stronger when using migrationbased definitions of 'competitors.' The paper concludes with still more evidence of interstate tax competition -the recent movement by states to effectively revive their 'death' taxes.
I. Introduction
The federal estate tax has received wide attention especially because its elimination has been a centerpiece of President George W. Bush's tax proposals (see, for example, Slemrod 2000, Poterba 2001 , and the articles in Gales, Hines and Slemrod 2001) . Largely overlooked, however, is the quiet revolution that has been taking place at the state level. Since 1976, thirty-one of the 48 contiguous states have repealed their 'death' or EIG (i.e., estate, inheritance and gift) taxes, instead relying only on the 'pick-up' tax whereby states capture a portion of the federal estate tax liability but do not increase the overall liability of the estate.
1 Of the remaining twelve states that still have EIG taxes, two have enacted legislation that will eliminate them by 2005 and others are considering doing so. Beyond the outright elimination of EIG taxes, many states have also acted to reduce them in a variety of ways, such as exempting certain beneficiaries such as the spouse.
This trend is noteworthy for several reasons. Foremost, it appears to us a prime example of intense interstate tax competition due to the growing size and political influence of the elderly population.
There is additional political pressure because states may worry that high EIG taxes will drive the high income elderly to move to bordering states or retirement havens. And the stakes may be substantial. For example, Longino and Crown (1989) estimate that Florida had a net gain of $5 billion in income from the elderly migrants it received between 1985 and 1990 , and Sastry (1992 estimates that one new job is created for every 2.5 elderly migrants it receives. State EIG tax competition also provides us with a unique opportunity to explore alternative definitions of 'competitor' states beyond simple geography because the movements of the tax base -the elderly -are fairly easy to track via historical migration data. And yet no research to our knowledge has explored interstate EIG tax competition.
Furthermore, these widespread changes in state EIG taxes provide substantial cross-sectional and 1 The 'pick-up tax,' sometimes referred to as the 'soak-up tax' or 'gap tax,' arises from federal tax law whereby state EIG taxes are credited dollar for dollar against the federal estate tax liability owed, up to a certain amount. The state therefore 'picks up' some of the federal estate tax revenue without increasing the total tax liability. All states take advantage of this tax credit. We use the term "EIG taxes" throughout to denote any estate, inheritance or gift tax rather than using the cumbersome label 'estate, inheritance and gift' or politically-charged 'death'. Five states eliminated their EIG taxes prior to 1960 or never had them.
time series variation that has been mostly overlooked by researchers interested in the behavioral effects of estate taxes. 2 And, state EIG tax policy is still in flux. Current and proposed changes in the federal estate tax have substantial revenue consequences for states, effectively eliminating EIG tax revenues for those that rely solely on the 'pick-up' tax. How will the states react to this change? At present, several states have enacted or are considering legislation that would effectively decouple their EIG taxes from the federal estate tax and so would preserve the revenue source. Indeed, as the federal estate tax is slowly eliminated, EIG taxes in states that continue to use them may be the only remaining taxes on bequests.
And yet little is known about them.
Our research seeks to fill this void. Using state-level data from 1967 to the present, we first describe the brief history and geographical pattern of these widespread reductions in state EIG taxes. To our knowledge, ours is the first research to document, in a systematic way, this phenomenon. We begin with a chronology of the states that eliminated completely their EIG taxes (thereby choosing to rely instead only on the pick-up tax.) However, there are many other ways that the states may reduce their EIG taxes, such as increasing exemptions or reducing tax rates. For example, in 1985 legislative sessions alone, nine states increased personal exemptions or fully exempted spouses (Eckl 1986 ). We therefore also describe this broader phenomena of tax reductions with an eye for evidence of state competition.
Given the many ways that states may reduce their EIG taxes and the subtleties of the timing of the wholesale elimination (many were phased in over several years), focusing only on one policy action is incomplete and likely to lead to erroneous conclusions. Rather, we explore the extent of state EIG tax competition by estimating each state's EIG tax reliance as a function of fiscal and political factors as well as the EIG tax policy of its 'competitors'. Our empirical approach follows that of Case, Hines and Rosen (1993) and includes state and time fixed effects. This research contributes to the tax competition literature both by considering a tax that has been overlooked and by extending the definition of what constitutes "neighbors/competitors" beyond simple geography. Specifically, we use historical information on the migration of elderly individuals between states to construct our weights, which, we argue, should better capture the competitive climate (or mobility of the tax base) among states. Past tax competition research has relied solely on geography, and no state competition research, to our knowledge, has used migration as a measure of Tiebout type pressures. Using our migration-based definitions of 'competitor'
states has a substantial impact on our results and suggests a stronger degree of tax competition.
After investigating the presence and determinants of interstate tax competition in this way, we
then look at what is currently happening in the state EIG tax policy arena. The current situation is rather remarkable in the swiftness with which the states are reacting to changes in federal estate tax policy that threatens to eliminate their pick-up tax revenue source. And, it is strongly suggestive that state competition is again at work, this time however in the reinstitution (or reincarnation) of state EIG taxes.
II. Past Research
Our research borrows insights from and has possible implications for at least three literatures --state competition, elderly migration, and federal estate taxation. Our primary contribution is to the state competition literature, as our research first documents the phenomena of widespread reductions of state EIG taxes and then explores it empirically as a classic case of state tax competition. We also bring new insights to this area by considering alternative definitions of 'neighbor' or 'competitor', which go beyond simple geography. Because the tax base that the states may be competing over consists primarily of the elderly, our work intersects with research into Tiebout elderly migration. Finally, both because of the temporal and cross-sectional variability in state EIG taxes we uncover and because reducing EIG taxes may have behavioral consequences other than migration which might benefit the states (e.g., increased savings or labor supply), research on the federal estate tax becomes relevant.
A. State Tax Competition and Elderly Migration
While there are many arenas in which states interact with one another, the prevailing literature can be broken down into three major areas --expenditures, program adoptions and taxation. While there are insights to be gained from all three, the tax competition area is clearly the most relevant for us. The mobility of capital plays an important role in past models of tax competition. In these models, surveyed by Wilson (1999) , capital flows between jurisdictions as it searches for the highest after-tax rate of return. A government will attempt to encourage this inflow by lowering the tax it places on capital to a level below that of its neighbors. In response, the first jurisdiction will often lower its tax rate and a battle of undercutting will often result. In a world of perfect capital mobility, the equilibrium outcome will be for states to eliminate the tax in question. In reality, capital is not perfectly mobile, as there is often a cost associated with relocation. Hence, one does not witness such extreme results because at some level, the savings received with lower taxation will not offset the additional moving costs incurred by relocating capital.
The spatial econometric techniques utilized by Case, Hines and Rosen (1993) and Baicker (2001) in their analyses of state expenditures have allowed for a recent wave of empirical research focusing on the dimensions, if any, in which tax competition is taking place. Not surprisingly, those taxes that are considered to have a mobile tax base, such as property taxes (Heyndels and Vuchelen 1998 , Brueckner and Saavedra 2001 , and Revelli 2001 , business taxes (Buettner 2001) and excise taxes on motor fuel and cigarettes (Rork, forthcoming) are found to be subject to the forces of tax competition by neighboring jurisdictions. In addition, Case (1993) and Besley and Case (1995) argue for a political component to tax competition, in that voters are likely to look to taxes of neighboring states as a means of assessing economic conditions and hence the performance of elected officials at home.
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The lesson from this research appears to be that states are engaged in tax competition with their neighbors, especially when the tax base is thought to be mobile. Just what tax base are the states competing over in the case of EIG taxes? It appears likely that the tax base primarily consists of the 3 Beyond taxation, neighboring jurisdictions have also been found to influence the adoptions of lotteries (Alm, McKee and Skidmore 1993) , tax abatements (Anderson and Wassmer 1994), growth controls (Brueckner 1998) and environmental regulations (Fredriksson and Millimet 2002) .
elderly, although as we discuss below, eliminating EIG taxes may have other behavioral consequences.
States may be competing for wealthy elderly individuals who might choose their residence on the basis of state tax policy. There is some support that elders are considering EIG taxes when they make migration decisions. Using migration flows of elderly individuals, Voss et al (1988) and Houtenville (2001, 2003) find evidence that high state EIG tax rates discourage in-migration. However, the one study that examines individual level data and simulates the effects of an actual change in state EIG tax policy finds no significant effect (Dresher 1994) . Interestingly, research in this area has also largely overlooked the dramatic changes in state EIG taxes over the last thirty years and instead has focused chiefly on cross-sectional differences. One exception is Bakija and Slemrod (2002) , who look at the number and size of federal estate tax returns over time in relation to state EIG and income tax policies; their preliminary evidence suggests that the elderly do respond to state EIG taxes in their location decisions.
Whether attracting or retaining the elderly is a wise policy is also unclear. While the presumption by many is that elderly migrants positively affect the state (Longino and Crown 1989 call them "pure gold" in estimating that Florida had a net gain of $5 billion in income from the elderly migrants it received during 1985-90), their total effect is likely more complex, especially on the public sector. A comprehensive analysis that weighs all of their possible effects does not exist, a void noted and discussed by Serow (1992) .
Regardless of what research has found, it is clear that at least some practitioners believe that EIG taxes are a powerful motivator to move: This quote suggests that elderly migration may have been a factor in Michigan's decision to eliminate its estate tax. Perhaps even more important is that it reveals that a state's competitors are not necessarily limited to its geographic neighbors, as is assumed in all of the tax competition studies we know of (and cite above). Exploring whether this kind of thinking is typical is one of the purposes of this paper.
B. Federal Estate Taxation
As discussed in the next section, state EIG taxes are tightly linked to the federal estate tax, which is currently being reduced and may be eliminated in the near future. In other areas of federal taxation, states have been shown to react to changes in federal taxes. Besley and Rosen (1998) show that states match increases in federal gasoline taxation with an increase in state tax rates. Goodspeed (2000 Goodspeed ( , 2002 discovered a similar responsiveness between national and local income taxes among European states. In our descriptive analysis, we too see a pattern of reducing state EIG taxes during times of major federal tax reforms. And, in the last section of this paper, we report on the way that states are currently reacting to the recent changes in the federal estate tax. transfers (e.g., Kuehlwein 1994 , Joulfaian 2000a , McGarry 2001 , Poterba 2001 , and Page 2003 . Still others have considered the impact on charitable contributions (Joulfaian 2000b, and Joulfaian 1996) and capital gains realization (Auten and Joulfaian 2001 Joulfaian (2000a, b) likewise uses state variability to help identify the effects of estate taxation on inter vivos giving and charitable contributions, respectively, although his analyses are only limited to federal estate tax returns.
To our knowledge, only Bakija, Gale and Slemrod (2003) has taken advantage of the variability in state EIG tax policy over time, which as we discuss next, is quite extensive.
III. A Primer on State EIG Taxes
State EIG taxes are made up of three different types of taxes, 1) estate taxes, 2) inheritance taxes, and 3) gift taxes. 4 Estate and inheritance taxes are levied on the transfer of wealth that occurs at death and as such are determined by the decedent's state of residence. The primary difference between the two is that because inheritance taxes are levied on the individual beneficiaries of transfers made at 4 For further discussion of the history and specifics of state death taxes, see Eckl (1986) .
death (and within two years of death), the tax rates may differ depending upon the type of beneficiary.
Typically, those beneficiaries with the closest relationship to the deceased have the lowest rates (e.g., a spouse would pay less than a nephew). Conversely, an estate tax is levied on the net estate of the deceased. The type of beneficiaries of the estate has no effect on the tax imposed unless the beneficiary is exempt (such as a surviving spouse Eckl (1986) and direct correspondence with state officials.
A. A Quiet Revolution in State EIG Taxes
Prior to 1960, four states chose to levy only the pick-up tax -Alabama, Arkansas, Florida and Georgia. Not only are all of these southern states, but also the latter three are known as or are becoming 5 It is interesting to note that federal estate/inheritance had been enacted and subsequently repealed several times prior to 1916, often to support a war. See Gale and Slemrod (2000) and for a brief history and thorough discussion of the workings of the federal estate tax. 6 There are obvious limitations to this measure. A preferable measure might be the date that the law was proposed or was voted on. However, the fact that laws must pass various legislative bodies and the governor makes this difficult. In addition, the fact that many states have phased their laws in slowly suggests that the effective date may have been an important part of the decision.
retirement havens for the younger elderly (Conway and Houtenville, 2003 have enacted legislation that will do so in the next few years. This suggests that the movement may be picking up momentum again. It also reveals that states may react to federal tax changes in setting their own EIG tax policy, as found in other policy arenas by Besley and Rosen (1998) and Goodspeed (2000 Goodspeed ( , 2002 . At the same time, however, the phasing out of the federal estate tax (and thus the 'pick-up tax' revenues the states receive) has prompted several states to decouple their EIG taxes from the federal tax, which effectively reinstitutes a state tax on the estate. We discuss this development further in section VI. Of course, part of the problem with this analysis is that we are not controlling for other things.
One of those things is the subtleties in the timing of the policy actions. Many were phased in over several years and there is likely a significant lag between when the decision was made and when the law became effective (witness Lousiana and Connecticut). Another important factor is that the states have many ways of reducing their EIG taxes beyond wholesale elimination. We discuss some of those changes next.
B. Other Ways that States May Compete
An examination of state EIG tax policy changes reported in various editions of Significant Are there obvious patterns in these smaller changes? Our limited inquiry leads us to believe so.
The vast majority of the changes during this period effectively reduced taxes, either by exempting entire classes of beneficiaries or estates, or by raising exemptions or lowering tax rates. And, as mentioned earlier, many of these reductions were precursors to the wholesale phase-out of the tax. Those actions that increased taxes tended to be more subtle (e.g., accelerated collection) or temporary (e.g., Ohio's delay of making spouses' exempt.) Likewise, the same states tend to appear in these report summaries, such as Connecticut and New York. Geography also appears to play a role as revealed by the flurry of changes taking place in Connecticut, New York, Rhode Island and New Jersey in the late 1980's and early 1990's, and in North Carolina, South Carolina and Tennessee during the same period.
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These reports also make clear that focusing on one policy change -the date on which the elimination of state EIG taxes in favor of the 'pick-up' tax became effective -is missing other important avenues for state competition and also the subtleties of how it took place. For instance, Wisconsin eliminated its tax effective on January 1, 1992. However, it began phasing out its tax in 1987 --the year after its neighbor, Minnesota, eliminated its tax, and 3 years after another neighbor, Illinois, eliminated its tax. Likewise, although Wisconsin's neighbor, Iowa, continues to have an EIG tax, it completely exempted spouses from inheritance taxation after 1987, the year in which Wisconsin began phasing out its tax.
Similar interactions occurred between other neighboring states.
Ideally, one would study the individual policy changes, big and small, and the interactions between states; however, quantifying and distilling those changes into a variable to analyze is very difficult. We therefore focus on the EIG tax revenues generated by each state as the best summary measure of their 11 In chronological order, Connecticut placed a 10% surcharge on inheritance taxes in 1983, followed by New York who allowed unlimited deductions for spouses. In 1985, CT raised inheritance tax exemptions, and New Jersey also "reduced (its) inheritance tax". In 1986 Connecticut began phasing out its inheritance tax on spouses. In 1987, RI began phasing out its estate tax altogether, and NJ exempted spouses effective 7/1/88. In 1990, CT, NY and RI all accelerated the collection of tax payments and NY expanded the tax base to include out-of state property. For North Carolina, South Carolina and Tennessee, for example, in 1987 alone SC began phasing out the estate tax (completed by 7/1/91), NC increased its inheritance tax credits and TN increased exemptions for two types of beneficiaries.
policies. What has happened to state EIG tax revenues during this period? Figure 2 reports the average proportion of state tax revenue that came from state EIG taxes in every year from 1968 until 1999.
Interestingly, we see that the prominence of state EIG taxes began to fall well before New Mexico kicked off the 'pick-up' revolution in 1976. In fact, it fell most steeply between 1968 and 1976, and continued its steep descent into the mid-80's where it has held fairly steady except for an uptick in the late 1990's (which is likely due to large increases in estate sizes due to the economic boom). This figure highlights that the competition on state EIG taxes is not just limited to wholesale elimination; it also emphasizes the need to control for the level of wealth in estimating state EIG tax revenues, which we are able to do using state and time fixed effects.
IV. Defining 'Competitors' and Other Model Specification Issues
The data used in our analyses encompasses 32 years of history from 1967-1999, as 1999 is the last year for which information on some of our variables is available. We follow the practice of Case, Rosen and Hines (1993) We also use data on elderly migration. The elderly migration flows during 1965-70 -that is, how many 12 Population breakdowns by state for the 85+ category were first reported in 1980. For years prior, the number was estimated based on 1) the difference in overall population growth between the state and the nation, 2) the difference in population growth for the 65+ group between the state and the nation, and 3) the difference between the growth rate of each state for 1980-1999 in the 65+ and 85+ categories. The exact algorithm is available upon request.
elderly moved between each pair of states -is obtained from the 1970 Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) using MicroAnalyst software.
A. The Econometric Model
We follow Case, Hines and Rosen (1993) by assuming that our EIG tax reliance measure is a function of state characteristics (X it ), state and time fixed effects, and the tax measure of its 'competitors'. Denoting T it to be the tax measure in state i at time t yields a linear relationship of
where T jt represents the competitor's tax measure, δt and ζi are year and state fixed effects, respectively, and u it is a mean zero, normally distributed random error. Since states have more than one competitor, T jt is replaced by Σj w ij T jt , where w ij represents the weight assigned to state j. We discuss in the next session the four different sets of weights we use.
Each state, therefore, has a set of weights (which can be thought of as a 48x1 vector) signifying how important another state's tax measure is in its own determination. Equation (1) can be written as:
where W is a weighting matrix assigning competitors to every state. This is known as a spatial lag model. The inclusion of T t on the right hand side of equation (2) means that estimation by OLS will be inconsistent, due to correlation with the error or simultaneity bias. Intuitively, if tax competition is taking place, then the EIG policies of one's competitors are going to be simultaneously determined with one's own -e.g., Alabama's policies are affected by what Georgia is doing and Georgia, in turn, will react to what Alabama does. To deal with this endogeneity, we estimate equation (2) using the instrumental variables approach outlined in Kelejian and Prucha (1998) (2)) required for our instruments, the Hausman, Sargan N*R 2 and Basmann tests, and our model passes all three. We also verify that WX is jointly statistically significant in the first stage regression (such that it is correlated with WT).
A final consideration is the likelihood that the error term, u, in equation (2) is both heteroskedastic and serially correlated. The heteroskedasticity may arise because of the sampling variability of our dependent variable -one would expect a small state to have a larger variance than a large state, since the former is going to be more strongly affected by the number and type of people who die each year. The correlation may arise because we are following the same states across time and there may be serial correlation within a state over time that is not captured entirely by the state fixed effects. In addition, other types of correlation may exist (e.g., across states at a point in time) that are not captured by our model. For all of these reasons, we calculate our standard errors via the bootstrap method in which 500 random samples of our original sample size are drawn with replacement and then used to estimate 500 tax reliance equations. These 500 sets of estimated coefficients are used to construct the bootstrap estimates of the coefficient covariance matrix (standard errors and covariances). Covariance estimates calculated via bootstrap are robust to correlation among the errors and heteroskedasticity.
B. Constructing the Spatial Weights
Since the purpose of our analyses is to discover the factors that push a state toward reducing its EIG taxes, defining which states are competing with one another (i.e., defining W in equation (2)) is estimates, even in the presence of spatial error dependence.
critical. Accordingly, we use four different weighting matrices in exploring which states are competitors, or neighbors, with one another.
For comparison with past studies of state competition, we begin with two typical geography-based weights before moving on to two other weights that use real economic information in the form of elderly migration patterns. The first set of geographic weights used is known as contiguity weights. States are considered 'competitors' if they share a common geographic border. In the case of New Hampshire, for instance, Massachusetts, Maine and Vermont would be considered 'competitors', whereas Alabama would not. Each neighboring state would be given equal weight, as they are assumed to exert equal influence. It is common for weights to be row-standardized, meaning that the weights sum up to one.
Continuing with the New Hampshire example, Massachusetts, Vermont and Maine would each be given a weight of 1/3, whereas Alabama would be assigned a weight of zero.
In the above example, it may be the case that Massachusetts wields more influence on New
Hampshire than Maine, as it has a larger population. Thus, we create a second set of geographic weights known as population-contiguity weights. States must still share a common geographic border to be considered a competitor, but now the weight varies on the basis of population. To create the weight for
Massachusetts, the population of Massachusetts would be divided by the entire bordering population (i.e., the population of Massachusetts, Vermont and Maine). Note that in this case the weights are row standardized. A non-row standardized weight for Massachusetts in this case would be just its population.
Our other two measures are in line with the aforementioned quote from The Gavel, which alluded to how states may consider the policies of other states to which they are losing or gaining large numbers of elderly individuals. Thus, we construct two other sets of weights, referred to as flow and corridor, which are based on historical elderly migration flows using 1965-1970 migration flow data from the 1970 PUMS.
State j will be considered a flow competitor of state i should it be the case that there are elderly migrants moving from state j to state i, that is, state i is receiving elderly migrants from state j. Given that most interstate elderly movement is across borders, this measure will still be heavily based on geography, but this measure allows us to also account for Michigan-Florida or Michigan-New York competition as well. indeed one hypothesis maintains that it is the goal of these actions. We therefore use the same weights for the entire period the data covers. One alternative is to update the measure every 10 years as it becomes available through the census. However, this would lead to discrete changes at 10-year intervals, some of which may be due to sampling error as the flow estimates are based on a sample of the total population. We can also take comfort in the fact that primary elderly migration patterns, especially 14 In creating the flow and corridor weights, we also tried limiting ourselves to high-income elderly migrants (those with annual income of more than $25000 in 1970) but found that it made little difference in the results.
corridors, have changed fairly slowly over time. 15 Finally, it is important to note that because of the prevalence of border moves, all four measures place some weight on geographic neighbors. The latter two measures augment geography by taking account of movements beyond the bordering states and are based on what we hypothesize the states are competing over.
C. Choice of Variables
The means of our dependent and explanatory variables are listed in Appendix A. Although imperfect, we believe that state EIG tax revenues are the best summary measure of a state's approach to estate, inheritance and gift taxation. It should capture all of the deliberate changes that a state makes to its EIG tax laws and distill them into a measure that the state itself should care about, the revenues produced. It is also a measure that is easy for taxpayers to understand. In addition, although state EIG tax revenues are going to be affected by the levels and types of individual wealth, the richness of the data allows us to control for these confounding effects with state and time fixed effects, as well as our explanatory variables.
Our primary measure of state EIG tax policy, T in equations (1) and (2), is the tax share measure, calculated by dividing state EIG tax revenues by overall state tax revenues. Taxpayers and policy makers should be considering the entire tax structure of the state when making their decisions, and this measure allows for that. Furthermore, it is not confounded by the size of the public sector. In our sensitivity analyses, we consider several alternative measures, including per capita state EIG taxes and state EIG taxes per death. One might argue that taxpayers would use these measures as a best guess of their approximate burden from the tax; however, we argue that they suffer from being an absolute rather than relative measure. 16 Other possible measures include marginal or average tax rates for a certain size 15 See Conway and Houtenville (2003) for a discussion of the trends they uncover contrasted with earlier studies, and Rogers and Raymer (1999) for a descriptive analysis of the internal migration behavior of the elderly since 1950. 16 For example, two states could have the same per capita or per death state EIG tax revenues, but EIG taxes could be a much smaller portion of the overall budget in one than the other if the size of their public sectors differed. And, we believe that a taxpayer would treat the two states differently for this reason. The per capita measure is also somewhat confounded by swings in other population groups (recall that we are controlling for the older age groups) because it is state tax revenues divided by total population. estate; however, as the discussion in section III reveals, a state's EIG tax system has many components beyond the tax rate for a given estate, and so such a measure also suffers from being incomplete. Rather, as one of our sensitivity checks we construct a pseudo-average tax rate using information about total federal gross estates in each state, which is available for a small number of years.
In order to isolate evidence of tax competition, we must include any other economic or political factors that we believe might affect a state's EIG policy over time, written as X in equations (1) and (2); however, we must also include any variables that help capture variation in our EIG tax reliance measure (T) that is not due to deliberate state EIG policy such as a change in the number and size of the estates in the state. One variable that belongs for both reasons is the per capita income in the state. A wealthier state may choose a different EIG policy both for economic and political reasons, but it is also more likely to have a greater number of large estates which will generate larger EIG revenues, regardless of the state's actual EIG policy. Per capita income also helps control for the tendency of states that have experienced the most in-migration (from all age groups) to also have high growth in income. Another variable with dual roles is the percentage of the population that is over age 65 and over age 85. We include both over 85 and over 65 because we hypothesize that the two age groups exert different sorts of pressures. The younger elderly may be a more politically active group than the older elderly, and there is evidence that their migration decisions are more sensitive to state fiscal policies (Conway and Houtenville, 2003) . The size of the older elderly population is more likely to approximate for the potential tax base; however, both variables may have confounding effects on state EIG revenues as they may capture both political pressures and the tax base.
To capture the state's fiscal situation (and thus the ability to reduce EIG taxes), we include the per capita federal transfers received by the state, the state debt per capita and the unemployment rate. 17 The 17 We define federal transfers and state debt in per capita terms as opposed to their revenue share because we believe that is a more accurate measure of a state's fiscal climate or income. For example, a state that receives $500 per capita is being subsidized much more heavily by the federal government and therefore should face fewer fiscal pressures than a state receiving $250 per capita. The same is not necessarily true for a comparison of tax shares as the variables are confounded by the size of the public sectors; two states could receive the same level of transfers per capita, but the one with the smaller public sector would appear better off if the share were used. A similar logic politic al environment is reflected by whether it is an election year, and dummy variables for whether both houses and the governor are democratic or republican.
We also include the percent of state tax revenue that is raised through personal income taxes and, separately, sales taxes. These variables capture the availability of other sources of revenue and so a strong presence of these taxes may make it easier to eliminate EIG taxes. In addition, potential elderly migrants likely consider the entire tax climate of the state in the decisions to move and there is some evidence that they are discouraged by an income tax (Cebula 1990 ). Thus, a state with a heavy income or sales tax burden may feel more pressure to reduce their EIG taxes to compete for wealthy elderly migrants. However, one might argue that states make decisions about all of their tax policies simultaneously, so that including these two alternative tax sources could lead to bias. We first address this by including the previous year's values for these taxes in all specifications. In addition, as a robustness check, we explore the impact of excluding these variables from the model.
Finally, we include state and year fixed effects in all specifications. The state effects should capture any unobserved state characteristics that are stable over time and would subsume any regional effects. The year effects control for changes in the federal tax code that may influence a state's decision; they also help capture business cycle effects, although not perfectly because states may be affected differently. However, including the state unemployment rate should help capture these differences.
V. Empirical Results
Our main model therefore includes the aforementioned explanatory variables plus state and time fixed effects, uses four different weighting schemes and our tax share measure of state EIG tax policy, and uses annual data from 1967 to 1999. However, as discussed further in subsection B, we subject this baseline model to several model specification checks. These checks include excluding the income and sales tax variables, using alternative measures of state EIG reliance, taking account of the fact that the applies to state debt.
states' ability to tinker with their EIG taxes has decreased over time as many now have only the 'pick-up' tax, and using a random weighting scheme to explore whether our model is picking up only spurious correlation rather than state competition. to an increase in our EIG reliance measure. This is not surprising given that the elderly are the most likely group to be leaving an estate; as discussed earlier, these variables play dual roles making interpretation difficult. We return to this issue when we discuss our alternative specifications. The only other variable that has a significant influence is the unemployment rate, which has a positive effect on a state's reliance on EIG taxes.
A. Main Model Results

B. Robustness Checks
Next we subject our baseline model to several robustness checks, the key results of which are summarized in Table 3 . First, we explore the impact of excluding the states' (lagged) reliance on personal income and sales taxes. The resulting estimated competitors' EIG tax reliance coefficients are reported in the second row of Table 3 , and the full results for these exercises are reported in Appendices B and C. In general, using either of these measures instead of the state EIG tax share yields similar results and even stronger evidence of interstate EIG tax competition. The estimated competitors' tax reliance coefficients increase in magnitude and range from .38 to .64. Most of the other coefficients also behave similarly across the two measures with a couple of exceptions. Personal income taxation appears less important and now has a positive effect, although it is not statistically significant. This is likely due to our now using an absolute measure. More important is that using EIG taxes per death diminishes the effect of having a very old population (percent over 85 years old). This lends additional support to our argument that including the age variables is capturing the fact that a larger elderly population is going to generate more EIG tax revenue. When one redefines to be EIG per death, this relationship is understandably weakened, as expected. Our third measure seeks to address all of these issues by using information about the aggregate value of gross estates reported on federal estate tax returns. 19 This variable should capture the geographic and temporal differences in the wealth of the elderly residing in the state, as well as capture any random variation in the types of people who die in a given year (e.g., a billionaire dies in a small state).
Unfortunately, however, this variable is only available for a limited number of years -1970, 1977, 1983, 1986, 1987, 1990, 1993 and 1998 . As noted in section III, the bulk of reductions in state EIG taxes came in the early years of our sample, which makes the missing early years of this data especially troubling.
Given the volatile nature of the data and the large number of holes in the data, we believe we must drop the missing years from this particular analysis, which reduces our sample size by approximately 75 percent. For this reason, we use this information as a sensitivity check rather than include it in our main specification.
Using this information we construct our third alternative measure, which redefines state EIG tax reliance to be total state EIG tax revenues divided by the aggregate value of gross estates reported on federal estate tax returns. This measure can be viewed as roughly approximating an average tax rate on estates. As the federal estate tax exempts small estates, this measure will be larger in a state if it 1) taxes small estates not subject to federal taxation, and/or 2) levies high taxes on those estates subject to federal taxation. The results of this exercise are reported in the fifth line of Table 3 ; the full set of results is reported in Appendix D. Again, the results are quite similar to our main specification and our other exercises. The estimated magnitude of tax competition is quite similar and tends to be even larger than in our baseline model, especially when migration-based weights are used. The statistical significance of these coefficients is diminished somewhat, which is not surprising given the much smaller number of observations and the loss of so many of the early years of apparent EIG tax competition. The other coefficients are affected in a manner similar to when we use per capita or per death measures in that personal income taxes are no longer important. This specification, however, completely eliminates the effects of having an elderly population on EIG revenues, further suggesting that the positive effects found in our baseline model are due to a larger EIG tax base.
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A related issue is that EIG taxes have the potential to be extremely volatile -e.g., the death of one billionaire in a small state can greatly skew the numbers for that one year. To make sure that such volatility is not driving our results and to smooth out the volatility, we re-estimate the model using threeyear moving averages of all of the variables to see if there is a difference. 21 The key results for this exercise are reported in the sixth row of Table 3 . Here we see that the estimated degree of interstate tax competition grows, if anything, when moving averages are used. The other variable coefficients, which we do not report for brevity, are similar with the two interesting exceptions that per capita federal transfers and election year, which were both negative before, are now also statistically significant.
Therefore, our evidence of interstate EIG tax competition is not due to random volatility in EIG tax 20 An alternative way of using this information is to include it as an explanatory variable. We re-estimated our baseline model including the aggregate value of gross estates and the per capita estate value, alternatively. Neither variable is ever statistically significant and the estimated competitors' tax reliance coefficients are quite similar and grow in magnitude, if anything. The only substantial difference was that the effect of having an elderly population was again diminished. The results are available upon request. 21 We calculated these averages two ways. One takes the moving average of the final variable --i.e., tax sharewhereas the other takes the moving average of the numerator (state death taxes) and of the denominator (total state tax revenues) separately and then calculates the shares. The two methods yielded nearly identical results, and so we report the results from the first method, which we find more intuitive.
revenues and appears to be quite robust to alternative measures of EIG tax reliance.
Our next set of exercises recognizes that once a state abolishes its EIG tax and relies solely on the pick-up tax, it has also greatly reduced its ability to further tinker with its EIG tax policy. Rather, its revenues are completely determined by the federal estate tax code and the estates of its taxpayers.
Because the number of 'pick-up' states grew steadily during the period our sample covers, one would expect to see a weakening of interstate tax competition --evidenced by a shrinking competitors' EIG tax reliance coefficient --over time. This presents us with an interesting opportunity to test the validity of our results and perhaps dispel the concern that we are simply picking up spurious correlations in state EIG tax revenues. To accomplish this, we split our sample into the 1970's, the 1980's and the 1990's and then reestimate the model for each time period.
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The next three rows of Table 3 report the estimated competitors' EIG tax coefficients for each of the four weights across the three time periods. Immediately evident is how our estimates of the degree of interstate tax competition steadily decline over time. In the 1970's, the response is always statistically significant and ranges from 0.42 to 0.93, the latter of which is about double the response found for other taxes (see footnote 18). In the 1980's, the response is smaller (ranging from 0.22 to 0.371) but still significant. In the 1990s, however, the response is either zero or even negative. We are somewhat puzzled by the negative response that appears with our migration-based weights for the 1990's. Given that there is a fairly small number of states who can still compete during this period (25 at the beginning and 17
by the end of the 1990's) it is not clear what this measure is capturing, especially for the majority of states in the sample who had little control over their state tax revenues. If it is a measure of the underlying spurious correlation between state tax revenues, then it makes the strong, positive responses we find in the rest of the analysis all the more remarkable. More generally, the explanatory power of the model (as measured by the R-squared and the joint significance of the explanatory variables other than the year and 22 The results we report use annual data. However, using the three-year moving averages did not substantively alter our results. Likewise, we split the sample into 4 periods -1968-75, 1976-83, 1984-91, 1992 -99 -and then into two 15-year periods and find very similar results. These results are available upon request.
state effects) steadily declines as one moves from the early years to the later years. This combined with the dramatic fall in the estimated responses over time is further support for our interpretation of these effects as interstate tax competition.
Another way to explore the issue is to allow the competitors' tax reliance coefficient to vary between 'pick-up' and non-'pick-up' states. Because 'pick-up' states no longer have any way to compete, we would expect their competitors' reliance coefficients to be zero. We accomplish this by adding an interaction term --whether a state is a 'pick-up' state in the prior year multiplied by the competitors' tax reliance variable -which we also treat as endogenous. If our hypothesis is correct, then the coefficient on the interaction term should be of approximately equal magnitude and opposite sign, so that the sum is zero. We perform a t-test of this restriction -i.e., whether the competitors' reliance coefficient for 'pick-up' states (which is the sum of the main coefficient and the interaction term) is zero.
Given that the majority of the tests are supportive, we also re-estimate the model imposing this restriction by interacting a non-'pick-up' dummy variable with the competitors' tax reliance variable.
The results of these exercises are reported in the tenth through twelfth lines of Table 3 . In the first exercise, strong evidence of our hypothesis exists as the coefficients on the interaction term are always negative, statistically significant and of near equal magnitude as the primary coefficient.
Furthermore, in three out of four cases we fail to reject the hypothesis that they sum to zero, suggesting that the effect of competitors' EIG reliance is zero for 'pick-up' states. (In the fourth case, it is negative rather than positive suggesting that any spurious correlation is negative, if anything, and is working against evidence of tax competition.) Imposing this restriction typically leads to the estimated magnitude of tax competition to increase over our baseline model. Dealing with 'pick-up' states in this way therefore strengthens our evidence of state EIG tax competition.
Our last robustness check attempts to verify that we are indeed capturing state tax competition and not spurious correlation or simply the random spread of a 'good' idea (although the latter should be captured with our time dummies "You don't see much advice suggesting people leave Massachusetts any more, but maybe attorneys will just re-draft those old letters and suggest that their clients move to Florida… That's where people used to go to avoid Massachusetts's estate tax, and it may be what they start doing again."
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Perhaps it is the current economic downturn that is forcing states to take any actions possible to retain and build up their tax revenues. It might even be a combination of factors -the reductions in EIG taxes have not produced the results (in either migration or other behavioral responses) that states had hoped for and this presents a perfect opportunity to bring the tax back at a small political cost and a large fiscal benefit.
In any case, it appears that the state EIG tax revolution is far from over.
VII. Concluding Remarks
This research takes a close look at what has happened to state 'death' or estate, inheritance and gift (EIG) taxes over the last 30 years. We note that more than 30 states have eliminated their EIG taxes (instead relying only on the 'pick-up' tax) since 1976, and that there have been many other state policy changes that likewise reduce their burden. And yet, this unique arena of potential interstate tax competition with a potentially mobile group of affluent elderly as the prize, has gone largely unexplored.
We investigate this phenomena by first exploring in a descriptive way the historical patterns of EIG tax elimination and reduction. This analysis reveals the complexity of the EIG itself and the difficulty of measuring efforts to eliminate or reduce it in a specific way. We then perform a spatial empirical analysis of the state's overall reliance on EIG taxes, and in so doing extend the usual definition of 'competitors' beyond geography by using historical information on elderly migration patterns, as presumably states should be watching the policies of states to which they are losing (or from which they are gaining) their tax base -the elderly. Our results provide very strong evidence of interstate tax competition, and the intensity of the competition grows as our migration-based definitions of 'competitors' are used and the time period is limited to an era in which states had maximum ability to change their policies. Now the movement to reduce or eliminate EIG taxes has reached the federal government as well.
Interestingly, the movement at the federal level appears to be inspiring the states to effectively bring back their EIG taxes through 'decoupling', and those actions have been swift and geographically clustered. The decoupling movement is too recent and ongoing for us to thoroughly examine its causes, but the emerging pattern provides additional, compelling evidence that interstate tax competition is once again playing a role.
What happens in the state EIG tax arena in the coming months and years is quite relevant for researchers interested in either state tax competition or the effects of estate taxation. The current movement to decouple is remarkable as one would expect a movement to increase taxes to be much slower than the usual 'race to the bottom', and yet the opposite is true here. Simply tracing out this movement to its logical conclusion will likely yield important insights into the nature of state policy competition and the politics of increasing taxes. And, as the federal estate tax is gradually eliminated, state EIG taxes will be the only remaining taxes on bequests. Looking backward, one can see that there has been a great many changes to these taxes. These changes provide a multitude of 'natural experiments' with which researchers can study the consequences of EIG taxation on individual behaviors and state budgets, and thereby draw inferences about optimal EIG tax policy. Looking forward, one sees a state tax policy that is still very much in flux and still apparently subject to the forces of state policy competition. all regressions included state and year fixed effects bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses *** significant at the 99th percent level, ** significant at the 95th percent level, and * significant at the 90th percent level
